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ABSTRACT 
Near the end of his life, Jacques Derrida, one of the most influential philosophers of 
the twentieth century, turned his attention from the traditional focus of philosophy, 
humans and humanity, to an emerging field of philosophical concern, animals. 
Interestingly, Derrida claimed in an address entitled The Animal That Therefore I Am 
that, 
   
since I began writing, in fact, I believe I have dedicated [my work] 
to the question of the living and of the living animal. For me that 
will always have been the most important and decisive question. I 
have addressed it a thousand times, either directly or obliquely, by 
means of readings of all the philosophers I have taken an interest 
in. . . . 
 
Derrida’s insistence that the question of the animal has always been the focus of his 
work reflects an interesting turn in philosophy at the end of the twentieth century, 
where the primacy of the human was rightfully being challenged, and the lives of 
animals were being considered on their own terms. Increasingly, the shift in focus 
from the primacy of the human to a more thoughtful consideration of animals has 
moved outside of just philosophy into other academic fields. These developments 
have been reflected in the emerging interdisciplinary field of posthumanism. 
Posthumanism, inclusive of all disciplines, seeks to shed the legacy of liberal 
humanism and the primacy of the human and instead consider all the interests of 
those that the human shares the world with (including animals, plants, technology, et 
cetera). Curiously however, while posthumanism has had an impact in most 
disciplines, outside of a few scholars, it is absent in the legal field (both in academia 
and in practice). Where the status of animals in the law has been challenged, it has 
largely been done through arguments derived from the legacy of liberal humanism. 
The two most significant challenges to the status of animals in the law have been 
mounted by the Nonhuman Rights Project in the United States, and the Great Ape 
Project, which has primarily been successful in New Zealand and Spain. Both 
projects have sought to expand legal rights to hominids, though each has adopted 
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different strategies. The Nonhuman Rights Project has sought to use arguments 
within existing legal paradigms to force the courts to recognize chimpanzees as 
“persons,” whereas the Great Ape project has intentionally avoided court (for fear of 
setting unfavorable precedents) and favored pressing change through legislation. 
Ultimately however, both projects are thoroughly rooted in liberal humanism and 
advance their arguments through proximity claims—the idea that certain animals, in 
these cases, apes, deserve legal consideration because of their similarity to humans. 
This paper is an interdisciplinary comparative analysis of the Nonhuman Rights 
Project’s failures in the United States and the Great Ape Project’s success in New 
Zealand. The success of the legislative approach of the Great Ape Project 
demonstrates the need to approach these arguments outside of the courtroom to avoid 
hostile judges, philosophical legacies, and archaic precedents. However, the Great 
Ape Project does not go far enough in expanding the rights of other beings as it relies 
on emphasizing similarities with humans as the sole reason for extending rights, 
leaving other beings, even higher order mammals like dolphins, without inclusion—
and a real possibility that any such inclusion would forever be cut off. Therefore, this 
paper proposes the need for a posthumanist foundation for pursuing the rights of 
other beings through legislative means. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In An Introduction to the Principle of Morals and Legislation, 
Jeremy Bentham signaled the complete break from the Cartesian world 
by stating, “the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? 
but, Can they suffer?”1 With that reconfiguration, Descartes’s Bête 
machine2 (animal-machine), would henceforth be little more than the 
starting point of properly thinking about animals. Whereas philosophy 
has taken Bentham’s question as a starting point for two hundred and 
twenty-eight years of thinking seriously about non-human beings—
from Bentham’s utilitarian approach to posthumanism’s shared 
finitude—the same has not been true in the law.3 This gap in 
                                                            
1 See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 311 n.1 (Hafner Publishing Co. 6th ed. 1948) (1789) (Bentham 
develops his theory of Utilitarianism in this work and offers a challenge to the 
dualism present in Descartes’s humanism.). See generally PETER SINGER, 
ANIMAL LIBERATION (Harper Perennial ed. 2009) which is often seen as the 
starting point of animal rights discourse in academia. Singer is a utilitarian in the 
Bentham tradition and is the first to call attention to the obscure note in 
Bentham’s principle work, sparking four decades of scholarly inquiry into 
Bentham’s question. 
2 See RENÉ DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND MEDITATIONS ON FIRST 
PHILOSOPHY (Donald A. Cress trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 4th ed. 1998) (1637 & 
1641) (where Descartes notoriously argues that the absolute division between 
animals and humans is a result of humans being the only ones that possess a 
consciousness (or a rational mind) and therefore, animals (and plants and all 
other material things) are essentially machines); see, e.g., LAWRENCE CAHOON, 
THE MODERN INTELLECTUAL TRADITION: FROM DESCARTES TO DERRIDA, THE 
GREAT COURSES (2010), https://www.thegreatcourses.com/courses/modern-
intellectual-tradition-from-descartes-to-derrida.html [http://perma.cc/WZZ8-
RNHZ] (“Descartes is a dualist . . . there’s only two boxes in which to put any 
reality . . . regarding anything else that exists [other than humans], either: it’s 
matter in motion—extended substance—a physical object like a rock, or it’s . . . 
a human mind and a soul. This means, nonhuman living things, have no soul or 
mind, they are purely physical, exactly like a machine . . . for Descartes, if I take 
my pet rabbit and put it in a blender and turn on the blender . . . the scream that 
the rabbit emits is not an indication that it feels pain. The rabbit feels no pain. It 
feels no more pain than my fan belt does, which also screams if it needs 
replacing, or if it’s very loose.”). 
3 See CARY WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM? 49-98 (2010) (tracing the 
developments in philosophy and liberal humanism post-Descartes and the 
contemporary shift towards posthumanism); see also CARY WOLFE, BEFORE THE 
LAW: HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS IN A BIOPOLITICAL FRAME (2013) 
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consideration is reflected in the arguments that are articulated when 
the law largely remains focused on the Cartesian/Bentham split as 
reflected by two projects, the Nonhuman Rights Project4 and the Great 
Ape Project,5 and the reactions to them.6 The Nonhuman Rights 
project has recently lost attempts at writ of habeas corpus for 
chimpanzees in New York,7 whereas the Great Ape Project has had 
some success, most notably in New Zealand.8 The two projects have 
however taken different strategies and lines of argument in pursuit of a 
similar objective—expanding the legal rights of hominoids. The 
Nonhuman Rights project has sought to use arguments within existing 
legal paradigms to force the courts to recognize hominoids as 
“persons,”9 whereas the Great Ape Project has intentionally avoided 
court (for fear of setting unfavorable precedents) and favored pressing 
change through legislation.10 The success of the legislative approach of 
                                                                                                                                            
[hereinafter WOLFE, BEFORE THE LAW] (discussing liberal humanism’s 
influence on law, the emergence of biopolitics, and a posthumanist response). 
4 See NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, https://www.nonhumanrights.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/MKY9-9WJN] (last visited Nov. 29, 2017). 
5 See generally JANE GOODALL ET AL., THE GREAT APE PROJECT: EQUALITY 
BEYOND HUMANITY (Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer eds., St. Martin’s Griffin ed. 
1996) (a collection of essays that articulate the need to recognize the incredibly 
close relationship between humans and great apes). 
6 See Kelsey Kobil, When it Comes to Standing, Two Legs are Better than Four, 
120 PENN ST. L. REV. 621, 642 (2015) (arguing against changing the status of 
Apes and other animals to anything other than property). 
7 See generally Steven M. Wise, Legal Personhood and the Nonhuman Rights 
Project, 17 ANIMAL L. 1 (2010) (discussing the strategy of bringing court 
challenges to achieve the goals of the Nonhuman Rights Project); see also Debra 
Cassens Weiss, Chimpanzees Lose Habeas Bid in New York’s Top Court; a 
Judge Sees a ‘Manifest Injustice,’, A.B.A. J. (May 8, 2018), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chimpanzees_lose_habeas_bid_in_new
_yorks_top_court_one_judge_sees_a_manifes [http://perma.cc/7NBK-9HRC]. 
8 See Rowan Taylor, A Step at a Time: New Zealand’s Progress Toward Hominid 
Rights, 7 ANIMAL L. 35, 37-40 (2001), for coverage of the legislative strategies 
and successes of the Great Ape Project New Zealand. 
9 See generally Wise, supra note 7. 
10 See Taylor, supra note 8, at 42; see also, e.g., Alexandra B. Rhodes, Saving 
Apes with the Laws of Men: Great Ape Protection in a Property-Based Animal 
Law System, 20 ANIMAL L. 191, 227 (2013) (discussing how advocates for Great 
Apes in the United States should work within the existing property rights system 
of common law because Americans are not particularly receptive to the legal 
personhood arguments). 
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the Great Ape Project demonstrates the need to approach these 
arguments outside the courtroom to avoid hostile judges11 and archaic 
precedent.12 However, the Great Ape Project does not go far enough in 
expanding the rights of others, because it largely relies on emphasizing 
similarities with humans as the sole reason for extending rights.13 
Therefore, the Great Ape Project leaves other beings, even higher 
order mammals, such as dolphins and elephants, without inclusion—
and a real possibility that inclusion will forever be cut off.14 The 
expansion of legal rights for nonhuman species should be pursued, not 
only through legislative means, but also through a posthumanist 
framework that insists that a multiplicity of species requires a 
multiplicity of legal considerations.15 
This Article, because it is interdisciplinary, begins by identifying 
the similarities between common law identification of animals as 
property16 and Descartes’s liberal humanist project.17 From there, this 
Article traces the developments in philosophy that try to gradually 
move away from the liberal humanist tradition, beginning with 
Bentham and Singer’s utilitarianism, which emphasizes an ethics of 
acting in the manner that causes the least suffering,18 and then moving 
                                                            
11 Taylor, supra note 8, at 42. 
12 See, e.g., Rhodes, supra note 10, at 195 (discussing the status of animals as 
property under common law in the United States). 
13 Taylor, supra note 8, at 41. 
14 See id. (arguing that the Great Ape Project New Zealand should not align with 
arguments about other animals’ legal rights and focus instead on the proximity 
of great apes to humans). 
15 See generally JACQUES DERRIDA, THE ANIMAL THAT THEREFORE I AM 32-48 
(Marie-Louise Mallet ed., David Wills trans., Fordham U. Press. ed. 2008) 
(discussing the arrogance of Man for giving themselves the right to encompass 
all other species within the singular “animal”—and the need to develop an 
approach that reflects a multiplicity); see also DONNA J. HARAWAY, WHEN 
SPECIES MEET 4 (2008), for her discussion of the multiplicity of being—“[t]o be 
one is always to become with many.” 
16 See, e.g., Jessica Eisen, Liberating Animal Law: Breaking Free from Human-
Use Typologies, 17 ANIMAL L. 59, 60 (2010). 
17 See generally CARY WOLFE, ANIMAL RITES: AMERICAN CULTURE, THE 
DISCOURSE OF SPECIES, AND POSTHUMANIST THEORY 1-44 (2003) (providing an 
intricate discussion of the development of liberal humanism and its ultimate 
poverty). 
18 See, e.g., BENTHAM, supra note 1; see also, e.g., SINGER, supra note 1. 
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to the capabilities approach of Martha Nussbaum.19 The tracing of the 
developments of philosophy in regard to nonhuman rights concludes 
by a discussion of posthumanism as the absolute break from the liberal 
humanist tradition.20 This Article then shifts back to the current legal 
challenges that, like posthumanism, seek to break the Cartesian 
tradition.21 Finally, this Article moves to discuss why a legislative 
approach is more desirable than court challenges, while at the same 
time the law currently lacks the vocabulary and philosophy to expand 
beyond arguing to extend rights to the species most closely related to 
humans.22 This Article concludes that posthumanism can fill the gaps 
that are currently lacking in legal discourse and help articulate a true 
vision for breaking from the Cartesian liberal humanist tradition.23 
II. BACKGROUND: ANIMALS IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 
A. Animals in Common Law 
When English common law was imported to the newly formed 
United States, so too was the common law status of animals as 
property.24 This classification of animals as property in common law 
dates to the earliest forms of Western legal systems, when animals 
were simply legal things.25 Steven Wise, the founder of the Nonhuman 
Rights Project, clarifies that for the Romans, any being that was 
“believed to lack free will—women, children, slaves, the insane, and 
nonhuman animals—were all at some time classified as property.”26 
This classification of animals as property is still one of the greatest 
                                                            
19 See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, 
NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006) (discussing the limitations of 
utilitarianism and articulating an alternative capabilities approach derived from a 
unique reading of Aristotle). 
20 See WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3, at 49-98. 
21 See generally NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 4. 
22 See generally Taylor, supra note 8, at 41-42 (discussing the concerns with 
aligning the Great Ape Project with animal rights in general). 
23 See generally WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3. 
24 Steven M. Wise, The Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, 23 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 471, 529-30 (1996). 
25 Id. at 543. 
26 Id. at 493. 
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challenges for animal welfare laws because as property, animals have 
no standing in court.27 
B. Common Law and the Liberal Humanist Tradition 
Steven Wise’s demonstration on how animals became property in 
the law28 compliments the consideration of animals in philosophy. 
Perhaps the most significant and still relevant consideration of animals 
in the seventeenth century was Rene Descartes’s bête machine, which 
considered animals as mechanistic—as machines—because they lack 
consciousness.29 This Cartesian spilt, between beings with 
consciousness (humans), and beings without, machines (animals), is 
analogous to the Roman law classification as those with free will and 
therefore legal persons, and those without, as property.30 Therefore, 
the legal consideration of animals develops alongside the philosophical 
development of, and challenges to, the liberal humanist tradition.31 
C. Utilitarianism: Jeremy Bentham and Peter Singer 
As Cary Wolfe pointed out,32 even though Bentham’s now famous 
rephrasing of the question of the animal to “Can they Suffer?” is now 
ubiquitous for challenging the Cartesian liberal humanist tradition, 
                                                            
27 Rhodes, supra note 10, at 195. 
28 See generally Wise, supra note 24 (providing an exhaustive account of the 
historical antecedents that account for the current status of animals under 
common law). 
29 See generally DESCARTES, supra note 2. 
30 See Wise, supra note 24, at 493. 
31 See generally Cary Wolfe, Flesh and Finitude: Thinking Animals in 
(Post)Humanist Philosophy, 37 SUBSTANCE 8 (2008) (arguing that the core of 
humanism is the ethical and ontological divide between humans and nonhuman 
animals). 
32 Id.; see also WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3, at 49-98 (tracing 
the development of the question of the animal through the analytical, and 
ultimately liberal humanist, philosophical tradition to the emergence of 
posthumanism in continental philosophy and biopolitics). It is important to note 
that while Wolfe’s analysis is excellent, it is by no means exhaustive and only 
focuses on contemporary philosophers. Id. For instance, Martin Heidegger, a 
significant figure when discussing the question of the animal, is only discussed 
in relation to Jacques Derrida’s treatment of Heidegger’s work. Id. The strength 
of Wolfe’s work is that it links his treatment of his contemporaries to the 
philosophical traditions that they represent—providing an impressive historical 
accounting of a philosophical divergence (perhaps more nuanced than analytic 
versus continental) that explains how we got to where we are. Id. 
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Bentham’s profound question was largely forgotten for nearly two 
hundred years.33 It was not until Peter Singer “drew attention to a 
passage buried . . . in a footnote in Jeremy Bentham’s An Introduction 
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,” in his seminal Animal 
Liberation, that Bentham’s question became a focal point of the 
question of the animal for philosophers.34 In Singer’s foundational 
work, he took up Bentham’s question and tried to answer it within a 
utilitarian framework.35 Singer’s utilitarian approach argued that if 
animals and humans share an equal interest in something, like “the 
interest in avoiding physical pain,” then “those interests are to be 
counted equally, with no automatic discount just because one of the 
beings is not human.”36 Singer’s utilitarianism, following Bentham’s, 
identified “the capacity for suffering as the vital characteristic that 
gives a being the right to equal consideration,”37 and therefore, any 
question of how animals should be treated should be answered in the 
way that most minimizes suffering.38 
D. Limits of Utilitarianism and Marta Nussbaum’s 
“Capabilities” 
While utilitarianism does a great deal to challenge the Cartesian 
world, it ultimately fails to escape a humanist discourse.39 Though 
never articulated specifically, utilitarian insistence on “suffering” as 
the prerequisite, applied analytically and dispassionately, does little to 
articulate animals having interests in and of themselves that may be 
separate from simply a shared and identifiable human-like 
“suffering.”40 Additionally, Martha Nussbaum pointed out, because 
utilitarianism focuses on calculations of pleasure/suffering to 
determine the ethical, the cruel treatment of animals is not foreclosed 
as unethical.41 In other words, “utilitarianism provides no way for 
                                                            
33 Wolfe, supra note 31, at 9. 
34 Id. 
35 See generally SINGER, supra note 1 (establishing the connection between a 
utilitarian ethic and the necessity of animal rights). 
36 WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3, at 58 (quoting Peter Singer, 
“Prologue: Ethics and the New Animal Liberation Movement”). 
37 SINGER, supra note 1, at 7. 
38 Id. at 21. 
39 WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3, at 62-64. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
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animals to be direct subjects of justice.”42 The internal contradictions 
of utilitarianism—in which not all animal interests are considered and 
cruelty to an animal could be seen as the ethical choice—leads Wolfe 
to consider Nussbaum’s Aristotelian43 “capabilities” approach.44 
Nussbaum derived the capabilities approach from an ambiguity in 
Aristotle’s configuration of humans as “political animals.”45 Man as 
political animal locates man not as distinct being, wholly other, but as 
a category of animal.46 For Nussbaum, this collapses the Cartesian 
divide and therefore “the rightness or wrongness of our treatment of 
. . . human or nonhuman . . . is . . . determined by the extent to which it 
enables or impedes their ‘flourishing.’”47 Ultimately, flourishing as an 
ethic argues “that no sentient animal should be cut off from the chance 
for a flourishing life.”48 Wolfe was quick to point out that ultimately 
Nussbaum suffered two fundamental flaws in her approach: first, does 
human flourishing necessarily depend on animals suffering, and 
second, the utilitarian problem of competing rights is also a problem 
for Nussbaum’s flourishing.49 When confronted with competing 
interests, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach amounts to a human 
essentialism that prioritizes individual human capabilities against each 
other, while also revealing a deep strain of humanism informing her 
work.50 
                                                            
42 Id. at 64 (quoting Nussbaum). 
43 Id. at 65. Wolfe takes care to note that Nussbaum does a lot of work reading into 
an “ambiguity” in Aristotle to avoid the issue of “rationality as an ethical and 
ontological dividing line.” Id. 
44 Id. For whatever reason, Wolfe only briefly mentions an intermediary between 
utilitarianism and Nussbaum, which is the contractarian theory of John Rawls 
and others, which predicates rights on the ability to enter into contracts or some 
other form of reciprocal relationship. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE (1971). Perhaps the quick logical dead-end to contractarianism—with 
rights largely deriving from the reciprocal relationship between equals—does 
not warrant a detailed consideration. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 327. 
Ultimately, contractarianism is simply another way to articulate the Cartesian 
splint on different grounds. Id. 
45 WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3, at 65-66. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 66. 
48 Id. at 67 (quoting Nussbaum). 
49 Id. at 67. 
50 See id. at 66-68 (discussing Nussbaum’s “List of Central Human Functional 
Capabilities” and her ranking of some humans as apparently not-quite-human); 
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E. Shared Finitude and Anti- and Post-humanist Philosophy 
Wolfe’s exploration of the implications of Bentham’s 
utilitarianism embodied in the work of Peter Singer and Martha 
Nussbaum’s Aristotelian capabilities approach revealed that despite 
valiant attempts to break from Cartesian humanism, Bentham, Singer 
and Nussbaum ultimately were all unable to do so.51 Wolfe then 
moved through Cora Diamond’s challenge to the very discourse of 
rights.52 For Diamond, there was an important distinction between 
rights and justice.53 Wolfe explained that “rights” are “trivialized” and 
not equal the same as justice.54 Wolfe explained that “the language of 
rights still bears the imprint of the context in which it was shaped: 
Roman law and its codification of property rights—not least, of 
course, property rights over slaves.”55 Therefore, rights discourse 
invariably fails because the “tie between rights and a system of 
entitlement that is concerned, not with evil done to a person, but with 
how much he or she gets compared to other participants in the 
system.”56 Diamond confronted the problem of rights discourse by 
arguing that what should actually be the impetus of our moral concern 
for animals is our shared vulnerability.57 In other words, rights 
discourse in the analytic tradition, always itself inherently humanist, 
can never purport to be about justice because it is inevitably based on 
the “possession (or lack) of morally significant characteristics that can 
                                                                                                                                            
see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 76-78 (listing the “Central Human 
Capabilities” as follows: “1. Life . . . 2. Bodily Health . . . 3. Bodily Integrity . . . 
4. Senses, Imagination Thought . . . 5. Emotions . . . 6. Practical Reason . . . 7. 
Affiliation . . . 8. Other Species . . . 9. Play . . . 10. Control over One’s 
Environment.”). 
51 See generally WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3, at 49-69. 
52 Id. at 70-78. Importantly, Wolfe notes that Diamond, though deeply skeptical of 
what it means to “do” philosophy, is still herself very much of the analytic 
tradition. 
53 Id. at 73. 
54 Id. (quoting Diamond). 
55 Id. (paraphrasing Diamond). 
56 Id. at 73-74 (quoting Diamond). It should be obvious that the classification of 
animals as property under common law, which also derives from the Romans, is 
a nearly unbreakable category when attacked through rights discourse because it 
is, at its core, an epistemological dilemma. 
57 Id. at 74 (arguing that the precarious nature of being alive, with death always 
approaching, is where moral obligation arises). 
2019 A Conspiracy of Life 161 
be empirically derived.”58 Diamond also took care to note that those in 
the analytical tradition who seek to eliminate the lines between 
humans and animals as the basis for animal rights, as well as those 
who oppose animal rights because of this distinction, are both wrong.59 
Wolfe explained that “for Diamond, it is not by denying the special 
status of human being but by intensifying it that we can come to think 
of nonhuman animals not as bearers of interests or as rights holders but 
rather as something much more compelling: fellow creatures.”60 
Although Diamond’s work is impressive and groundbreaking, it is of 
the analytical tradition, and therefore there is an internal limitation that 
prevents her from being able “to open the question of justice beyond 
the human sphere alone.”61 
To get past the limitations inherent in the analytical tradition, 
Wolfe turned to the French continental philosopher, Jacques Derrida.62 
With this shift from analytic to continental, Wolfe also signaled a 
necessary shift away from liberal humanism and toward antihumanist 
and posthumanist discourses.63 Wolfe’s move is instructive, and this 
Article will argue that a similar move is necessary to truly challenge 
the status of animals in the law.64 
                                                            
58 Id. at 75. 
59 Id. at 76. 
60 Id. at 77. 
61 Id. at 80. Wolfe is concerned here with Diamond’s understanding of language in 
a philosophical sense, or perhaps her lack of accounting for language. Id. Wolfe 
sees Jacques Derrida’s theory of language and trace as a necessary component of 
opening the question of justice. Id. at 80-98. 
62 Id. at 80. 
63 Id. at 80-98. See also, generally, GILLES DELEUZE & FÉLIX GUATTARI, A 
THOUSAND PLATEAUS: CAPITALISM AND SCHIZOPHRENIA 232-310 (Brian 
Massumi trans., U. of Minn. Press ed. 1987) (developing an anti-humanist 
position through the concepts of “becoming,” including most famously, 
“becoming-animal.” Becoming is a resistance to the hierarchical structure of 
humanism by arguing for shifts from majority to minority positions, but 
importantly, not absolute shifts from one position to another—or one identity to 
another—but rather an always ongoing process of making anew). Contra, 
HARAWAY, supra note 15, at 30 (“Despite the keen competition, I am not sure I 
can find in philosophy a clearer display of misogyny, fear of aging, incuriosity 
about animals, and horror at the ordinariness of flesh, here [in A Thousand 
Plateaus] covered by the alibi of an anti-Oedipal and anticapitalist project.”). 
64 See generally WOLFE, BEFORE THE LAW, supra note 3 (a thoughtful exploration 
of the status of animals before the law and how biopolitics can be understood in 
that context); see also GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER 
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III. APPROACHES TO ADVANCING ANIMAL STATUS 
UNDER THE LAW: A POSTHUMANIST CRITIQUE 
A. NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT & THE GREAT APE 
PROJECT 
The Nonhuman Rights Project is perhaps the best-known 
organization working on animal rights in the law.65 Founded by Steven 
M. Wise, the Nonhuman Rights Project aims to advance the status of 
animals primarily through court challenges.66 Although the group has a 
variety of objectives, five in all, this Article’s focus is on its first 
objective, to recategorize animals under the law.67 In this objective, the 
Nonhuman Rights Project aims “[t]o change the common law status of 
great apes, elephants, dolphins, and whales from mere ‘things,’ which 
lack the capacity to possess any legal right, to ‘legal persons,’ who 
possess such fundamental rights as bodily liberty and bodily 
integrity.”68 In order to do this, the Nonhuman Rights Project has 
identified favorable jurisdictions and judges and seeks to file writs of 
habeas corpus and de homine replegiando.69 
The most recent and one of the most prolific challenges from the 
Nonhuman Rights Project concerns two chimpanzees named Hercules 
                                                                                                                                            
AND BARE LIFE (Werner Hamacher & David E. Wellbery eds., Daniel Heller-
Roazen trans., Stanford U. Press ed. 1998) (discussing how law functions under 
sovereign power and the possibilities, or lack of possibilities, of anomic space—
a space that conceivably nonhuman entities would inhabit). 
65 See NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 4. 
66 See Who We Are, NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, 
https://www.nonhumanrights.org/who-we-are/ [http://perma.cc/L4BL-EJ23] 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
67 Id. The five objectives of the Nonhuman Rights Project are: 1) To get great apes, 
elephants, dolphins, and whales recognized as “legal persons,” 2) to expand the 
considerations of other qualities that could further expand animals that could be 
considered “legal persons,” 3) to promote recognition of ethical and legal 
consideration of nonhuman animals, 4) to build a coalition to help secure legal 
rights for nonhuman animals, and 5) “To foster understanding of the social, 
historical, political, and legal justice of our arguments and the scientific 
discovery of other species’ cognitive and emotional complexity that informs 
them.” Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Wise, supra note 7, at 8. 
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and Leo that were leased to Stony Brook University.70 Hercules and 
Leo were experimented on for six years, having electrodes inserted 
into their muscles so that researchers could study how humans evolved 
to walk upright.71 The Nonhuman Rights Project filed a writ of habeas 
corpus in a New York state court on behalf of Hercules and Leo.72 The 
court denied the petition73 and the Nonhuman Rights Project 
appealed.74 The appeal was erroneously denied,75 and the Nonhuman 
Rights Project subsequently took advantage of the ability to file writs 
of habeas corpus multiple times under New York law and re-filed on 
behalf of Hercules and Leo.76 Surprisingly, the judge ordered the New 
York Attorney General to appear and “show cause” why an order 
should not be granted to the Nonhuman Rights Project for relief.77 The 
judge’s order stated that “upon a determination that Hercules and Leo 
are being unlawfully detained, [they are ordered for] immediate release 
and transfer forthwith to Save the Chimps.”78 This is a significant 
victory for the Nonhuman Rights Project because a hearing to 
determine whether a nonhuman was properly detained had never been 
granted.79 Unfortunately, the judge, although seemingly cognizant of 
the potential merits of the case, denied the writ of habeas corpus.80 
Nevertheless, the Nonhuman Rights Project declared that even getting 
into the courtroom to hear the rights of a nonhuman animal was a 
                                                            
70 Clients: Hercules and Leo, NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, 
https://www.nonhumanrights.org/hercules-leo/ [http://perma.cc/T9L7-2Q8X] 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2018). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Order to Show Cause Declined, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Hercules 
& Leo v. Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cty. Dec. 5, 2013) 
(No. 13-32098). 
74 Clients: Hercules and Leo, supra note 70. 
75 Decision & Order on Motion, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Hercules & 
Leo v. Stanley, (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t Apr. 3, 2014) (No. 2014-01825). 
76 Clients: Hercules and Leo, supra note 70. 
77 Amended Order to Show Cause, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Hercules 
& Leo v. Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Apr. 21, 2015) 
(No. 152736/15). 
78 Id. 
79 Clients: Hercules and Leo, supra note 70. 
80 Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project Inc. ex rel. Hercules & Leo v. Stanley, 16 
N.Y.S.3d 898, 917-18 (Sup. Ct. 2015). 
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victory.81 On this point, the Nonhuman Rights Project’s success and 
strategy are admirable, however, as will be shown, from a 
posthumanist perspective they can be dangerous.82 
While the Nonhuman Rights Project seeks to advance nonhuman 
animal rights through court challenges, a similar project, The Great 
Ape Project, employs a different strategy.83 The Great Ape Project has 
had much more success in accomplishing tangible victories in securing 
certain fundamental rights for Great Apes.84 The Great Ape Project has 
been successful in getting legislation passed that helps protect great 
apes, sometimes even extending human like rights to great apes.85 One 
of the ways that the Great Ape Project has made progress is by 
deliberately avoiding courts for fear of longstanding bias and 
speciesism causing judges to set negative precedents.86 The Great Ape 
Project’s successes, particularly in New Zealand and Spain are 
impressive.87 
The Great Ape Project’s greatest successes so far have come in 
New Zealand, beginning with the passage of the Animal Welfare Act 
of 1999.88 The Great Ape Project New Zealand had pressed for the 
inclusion of both a guardianship model for representation as well as 
specific rights for great apes.89 Although Great Ape Project New 
Zealand’s admittedly lofty demands were quickly rejected, Great Ape 
Project New Zealand was successful in carving out special recognition 
for hominids.90 This special recognition of the status of hominids was 
made tangible by a ban on the use of great apes in teaching, product 
testing, and research.91 However, the ban is not categorical and can be 
                                                            
81 Clients: Hercules and Leo, supra note 70. 
82 See generally LEONARD LAWLOR, THIS IS NOT SUFFICIENT: AN ESSAY ON 
ANIMALITY AND HUMAN NATURE IN DERRIDA (2007). 
83 See generally GREAT APE PROJECT BRAZIL, 
http://www.projetogap.org.br/en/mission-and-vision/ [http://perma.cc/D5ZR-
AS4Z] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018). 
84 Rhodes, supra note 10, at 210-15. 
85 Id. 
86 Taylor, supra note 8, at 42. 
87 See, e.g., id. for a discussion of the Great Ape Project’s successes in New 
Zealand; see also, e.g., Rhodes, supra note 10, at 210-15. 
88 See Taylor, supra note 8, at 37. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 37-38. 
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overcome if the use is “in the best interest of the individual great ape 
or is in the interest of that great ape’s species and the benefits are not 
outweighed by the likely harm to the great ape.”92 Significantly, 
although it does not codify “rights” for great apes, it does introduce a 
concept of “interests,” for both the species and the individual ape.93 In 
addition, where conflicts between species and individuals may arise, 
the act prioritizes the individual by making sure any benefits do not 
“outweigh” any potential harm to the individual.94 Although Great Ape 
Project New Zealand did not achieve a recognition of rights, it did 
secure some form of recognition that had never before been conferred 
to a non-human animal.95 With that said, the Great Ape Project’s legal 
strategy, like the Nonhuman Rights Project’s approach, has some 
fundamental limitations that might set back animal rights under the 
law.96 
B. A POSTHUMANIST CRITQUE 
Though the Nonhuman Rights Project and the Great Ape Project 
are fundamentally different in both tactics and objectives, they 
nevertheless share the same limitations and problems, which derive 
from tradition.97 Much like Singer, Nussbaum and Diamond are 
fundamentally limited by the humanist core of the analytic tradition; so 
too are the Nonhuman Rights Project and the Great Ape Project 
                                                            
92 Id. at 38 n.16 (quoting Primary Production Committee, Primary Production 
Committee Reports Back on Animal Welfare Legislation (press release) (May 
17, 1999)). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. The valuing of the individual, rather than the group, is an interesting 
acknowledgement of the individual’s interest in their self—in other words, it 
implicitly recognizes that the individual has some sense of self. 
95 Id. 
96 See generally JANE GOODALL ET AL., THE GREAT APE PROJECT: EQUALITY 
BEYOND HUMANITY (Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer eds., U.S. ed. 1994) (a 
collection of essays from well-known academics in various fields that are 
unified in arguing for rights for great apes because of their similarities to 
humans). 
97 See generally WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3, at 49-98 
(discussing the analytic tradition and the pervasiveness of liberal humanism ’as 
they relate to the question of the animal); see also, e.g., Wise, supra note 24, at 
8-10 (demonstrating how tradition shapes common law notions of how to 
account for animals). 
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limited by both the humanist core of common law tradition and their 
ultimately humanist approach to attaining animal rights.98 
The Nonhuman Rights Project has two fundamental problems with 
its approach and objective.99 First is what Great Ape Project New 
Zealand identified as the problem with bringing court challenges.100 
The second is that the Nonhuman Rights Project’s strategy risks 
making an argument for a biological continuum.101 In both cases, the 
negative consequences of the Nonhuman Rights Project could hinder 
any progress that has been made in animal rights law.102 
The first problem that the Nonhuman Rights Project’s approach 
faces is what Taylor describes as the “hominid cringe,”103 and the 
possibility of a resistance to their efforts because of slippery slope 
arguments.104 These two issues are the main problems with having 
judges decide cases and set possible precedent.105 The “hominid 
cringe” refers to the reluctance of humans to admit that they vary only 
slightly in genetics from their ape counterparts.106 This resistance can 
be the basis of a speciest disposition that many people possess.107 Such 
a disposition might lead judges automatically, regardless of reason and 
logic, to dismiss any challenge that calls into question human 
exceptionalism.108 Worse still, decisions derived primarily from a 
                                                            
98 See, e.g., Wise, supra note 24. 
99 See generally NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 4. 
100 See Taylor, supra note 8, at 42 (highlighting the possibility of encountering 
conservative justices and setting unfavorable precedent). 
101 See generally LAWLOR, supra note 82. 
102 Contra Wise, supra note 7 (arguing that the only way to change the existing 
common law is to systematically identify states, districts, and even particular 
judges, that might be receptive to the Nonhuman Rights Project’s arguments and 
therefore, be willing to go against precedent). 
103 Taylor, supra note 8, at 41-42. 
104 Kobil, supra note 6, at 639-40. 
105 Id. at 636-37. Much of Kobil’s argument is that only a “rogue” court could 
change precedent and therefore, the common law tradition of treating animals as 
property should be protected against the threat of judicial activism. 
106 Taylor, supra note 8, at 41-42. 
107 See generally Frank Newport, In U.S., 42% Believe Creationist View of Human 
Origins, GALLUP (June 2, 2014) http://news.gallup.com/poll/170822/believe-
creationist-view-human-origins.aspx [https://perma.cc/35CP-TF7V] (42 percent 
of Americans do not believe in evolution but rather, that a deity created humans 
in their exact present form). 
108 Taylor, supra note 8, at 42. 
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speciest logic would set precedent for future cases, making animal 
legal recognition even more difficult to attain.109 
The second problem that the Nonhuman Rights Project’s approach 
faces is the fear of a slippery slope.110 If Great Apes receive 
personhood, then what’s next? Dolphins? Pigs? Dogs? Salamanders? 
Microbes?111 There is a real fear among humanists (a valid fear, but 
not for the reasons they articulate) that by admitting our Ape cousins 
into the sphere of ethical and legal consideration, eventually every 
animal will have to be admitted to the once exclusive domain of 
humans.112 The slippery slope argument, as will be shown, is valid—
however, not because of this humanist logic.113 
The Great Ape Project’s approach faces similar problems that 
largely derive from their utilitarian origins.114 The Great Ape Project’s 
utilitarian logic opens it up to all of the same critiques that Diamond 
and Wolfe level at utilitarianism in philosophy, namely that the 
analytic empirical calculation of suffering invariably excuses and 
permits a great deal of suffering.115 In addition, the Great Ape 
Project’s narrow focus on great apes might foreclose the possibility of 
other animals, such as dolphins, whales and octopuses, from receiving 
similar legal consideration because we cannot articulate the same 
arguments of proximity to humanness.116 Finally, another issue that the 
Great Ape Project’s approach faces is the common law property 
problem, because where the Great Ape Project sees its strategy as a 
way of working within the property system by simply removing great 
apes from a classification as property, it inevitably leaves all other 
species still classified as property.117 
                                                            
109 Id. 
110 Kobil, supra note 6, at 639-40. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. Kobil goes further to worry that environmentalist might seize on the success 
of animal rights activist and start articulating similar lines of arguments for the 
rights of trees or rivers to bring court challenges. See id. at 641. 
113 LAWLOR, supra note 82. 
114 GOODALL ET AL., supra note 96. 
115 WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3, at 64. 
116 See Taylor, supra note 8, at 41 (discussing the need to avoid aligning great ape 
rights with a larger animal rights discourse). 
117 See generally Rhodes, supra note 10 (advocating for working within the 
property system in spite of its limitations because Americans are not receptive to 
perceiving animals as beings with personhood). 
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C. POSTHUMANISM OFFERS AN ALTERNATIVE 
APPROACH 
Posthumanism offers an alternative to the problems that emerge 
from the largely humanist projects of the Nonhuman Rights Project 
and the Great Ape Project.118 As noble as the Nonhuman Rights 
Project and the Great Ape Project are, the very concept of saving 
animals with the laws of men is specious.119 To combat the legacy of 
liberal humanism, which manifests in common law, a posthumanist 
perspective must be adopted.120 
1. The Anthropological Limit, Multiplicities, and Avoiding the 
Slippery Slope 
The first and most significant problem that posthumanism 
addresses is the valid concern of a slippery slope.121 The slippery slope 
argument is the concern that the recognition of one species of animal 
in any capacity other than property will necessarily lead to endless 
expansion of considerations that overburden courts and result in 
absurdities.122 Perhaps more than any other argument, the concern of a 
slippery slope is the most commonly articulated.123 For example, the 
                                                            
118 See generally Posthumanities, U. OF MINN. PRESS, 
https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/series/posthumanities 
[http://perma.cc/RJ2A-CK6G] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018) (an interdisciplinary 
book series edited by Cary Wolfe that contributes to the growing field of 
Posthumanities). 
119 Contra Rhodes, supra note 10 (arguing that all the existing frameworks are there 
to advance animal rights, and challenging them with too radical of propositions 
will be a self-defeating strategy). 
120 See generally Maneesha Deckha, Critical Animal Studies and Animal Law, 18 
ANIMAL L. 207 (2012) (arguing that a more aggressive subset of posthumanism, 
Critical Animal Studies, is where legal scholars should turn to escape the liberal 
humanist legacy). Although Deckha is correct, a more general intervention of 
Posthumanism will allow for more possibilities and a general consideration of 
the biopolitical, and therefore, should be pursued alongside the goals of Critical 
Animal Studies. 
121 See Kobil, supra note 6, at 639-40. 
122 Id. 
123 See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Next Rights Revolution?: It’s Bowser’s 
Time at Last, 51 NAT’L REV. 44 (1999) (suggesting that all of human society 
would cease to exist if animals were regarded as anything other than property). 
Presumably, the chaos that would result from allowing animals standing or some 
other form of recognition in court is because of the abysmal conditions in which 
many animals live their lives under human domain. 
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slippery slope argument often arises when pet owners pursue claims of 
negligent infliction of emotional distress.124 In Rabideau v. City of 
Racine, the judge explicitly denied the claim of negligent infliction of 
emotional distress as a matter of public policy.125 Judge Bablitch states 
that “[w]e are particularly concerned that were such a claim [as 
negligent infliction of emotional distress] to go forward, the law would 
proceed upon a course that had no just stopping point.”126 He 
continues, “[w]ere we to recognize a claim for damages for the 
negligent loss of a dog, we can find little basis for rationally 
distinguishing other categories of animal companion.”127 Although it 
would seem that a rational test could be developed to distinguish 
between the companionship that a goldfish provides from the 
companionship that a dog provides, it is irrelevant to the underlying 
logic that a slippery slope would result in chaos128 and the possible 
collapse of human society.129 
The fear of a slippery slope—the impending biological 
continuum—that emerges in law is the result of the liberal humanist 
tradition that posthumanism seeks to challenge.130 The terror that 
Epstein, Judge Bablitch, and others express is the result of a possible 
destabilization of the supremacy of the human131 and, therefore, a 
collapse of liberal humanism. Although the supremacy of the human 
under liberal humanism is precisely the location of the permissible 
atrocities committed by humans to animals, the unease of a biological 
continuum is not without warrant.132 However, the reason for that 
unease is not because of upsetting the supremacy of the human, rather 
                                                            
124 See Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 797-98 (Wis. 2001), where a 
companion animal, a dog, was shot and killed by a police officer and the dog’s 
human companion sought damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
The court concludes that the only damages available are for property loss. 
125 Id. at 798. 
126 Id. at 799. 
127 Id. 
128 Kobil, supra note 6, at 638. 
129 Epstein, supra note 123. 
130 See generally WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3. 
131 See generally Taylor, supra note 8, at 41-42 (discussing the “hominid cringe”). 
132 See DERRIDA, supra note 15, at 29-30, where Derrida insists that the absolute 
division between human and nonhuman animal must be maintained. 
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a much more sinister concern with dissolving the anthropological 
limit.133 
French Philosopher Jacque Derrida expressed the anti-humanist, or 
posthumanist, insistence on maintaining a human/animal divide during 
his ten-hour address to the 1997 Cerisy conference.134 Derrida was 
aware that his attack on the anthropological limit would have two 
risks: first, the obvious risk of slipping back into the liberal humanist 
paradigm, and second, the specter of biological continuism.135 Derrida 
states that he “never believed in some homogeneous continuity 
between what calls itself man and what he calls the animal” and that he 
wasn’t “about . . . to do so now.”136 Derrida continued to insist that 
anyone who argues for some complete dissolution of the 
anthropological limit should be met with suspicion, stating: 
When that cause or interest seeks to profit from what it 
simplistically suspects to be a biologistic continuism, 
whose sinister connotations we are well aware of, or 
more generally to profit from what is suspected as a 
geneticism that one might wish to associate with this 
scatterbrained accusation of continuism, at that point 
the undertaking becomes in any case so aberrant that it 
neither calls for nor, it seems to me, deserves any direct 
discussion on my part.137 
Derrida’s insistence on maintaining the anthropological limit is 
derived from the “sinister connotations” of dissolving the limit;138 
                                                            
133 Id. at 30. The anthropological limit is the “rupture . . . between those who say 
‘we men,’ . . . and . . . what he calls the animal or animals.” Id. Essentially, the 
rupture created by the Cartesian moment—the division between man and all 
other animal life—that liberal humanism is predicated upon. 
134 See generally id. The Animal that Therefore I Am is the subsequent translation 
and publication of Derrida’s address to the Cerisy conference. The Colloques de 
Cerisy are a series of seminars by important, primarily French, intellectuals that 
take place at the Centre culturel international de Cerisy-la-Salle. They are 
foundational to building contemporary French intellectual culture. 
135 Id. at 30. Derrida is using biological continuism to describe a hierarchy of 
beings that contains no absolute divisions between species. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. Derrida is challenging both the consideration of animals and rights in the 
analytic tradition, which inevitably results in a deterioration of the 
anthropological limit, but also the more “sinister” result of continuism. 
138 Id. 
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however, he failed to elaborate on this point.139 Leonard Lawlor, in his 
essay about Derrida’s address, clarified that “if one raises animals to 
the level of humans, or if one lowers humans to the level of animals, 
one ignores the difference that requires living beings to be treated in a 
variety of ways.”140 
Derrida’s—and by extension, posthumanism’s—insistence on 
maintaining the anthropological limit negates the concern for a 
slippery slope.141 By securing an absolute position of difference from 
all other animals for all humans, Derrida prevents the inevitable 
catastrophe and apocalyptic collapse “of human society” that Epstein 
is concerned about.142 However, unlike the Cartesian divide in liberal 
humanism, Derrida explains that the anthropological limit cannot be 
seen as single and indivisible.143 Instead the limit must be conceptually 
thought of as abyssal.144 Derrida states that it must be abyssal: 
Not just because . . . [this talk] will concern what 
sprouts or grows at the limit, around the limit, by 
maintaining the limit, but also what feeds the limit, 
generates it, raises it, and complicates it. Everything 
I’ll say will consist, certainly not in effacing the limit, 
but in multiplying its figures, in complicating, 
thickening, delinearizing, folding, and dividing the line 
precisely by making it increase and multiply.145 
This “delinearizing” and “multiplying” of limits is recognition that the 
absolute position of the human is mirrored by the absolute position of 
                                                            
139 Id. 
140 See generally LAWLOR, supra note 82, at 25-26. Essentially, the creation of a 
continuum allows for any being on that continuum to slide up and down—and 
when we consider that Derrida is an Algerian Jew, the “sinister connotations” 
are likely a reference to anti-Semite ideologies, particularly Nazism, that slid 
Jews down the continuum and therefore Nazis were able to justify their 
atrocities as permissible. Id. at 24-27. Slavery in the Americas and colonialism 
are also examples where the elimination of the limit allowed for some humans to 
be more human than others. Id. Derrida insists that the limit be maintained to 
prevent human atrocities from ever becoming permissible. Id. 
141 See generally Kobil, supra note 6, at 639-41 (discussing the “slippery slope”). 
142 Epstein, supra note 123. 
143 DERRIDA, supra note 15, at 31. 
144 Id.; see Serge Margel, Derrida and the Power of Words, 36 OXFORD LITERARY 
REV. 254, 255-56 (2014) (discussing how Derrida uses “abyssal” in his work). 
145 DERRIDA, supra note 15, at 29. 
172 UMass Law Review v. 14 | 150 
the great ape and the absolute position of the octopus—creating a 
multiplicity of limits between species and necessitating individual 
evaluations of interspecies relationships.146 
To facilitate the conceptualization of the multiplicity of the limits, 
Derrida challenged the use of the word animal— “a word that men 
have given themselves the right to give.”147 Derrida argued that “[m]en 
would be first and foremost those living creatures who have given 
themselves the word that enables them to speak of the animal with a 
single voice and to designate it as the single being.”148 Derrida, 
therefore, identified the lexical anthropological limit that results in the 
binary division between human and the multiplicity of all other 
species, collapsed into the singular animal.149 This lexical problem is 
precisely the problem that confronts the Great Ape Project as it at once 
seeks to maintain the limit but also to allow a single species to jump to 
the human side.150 Derrida challenges the singular generality of “the 
animal” by purposing the neologism, animot.151 Animot, in French, 
“sounds like animaux, animals in the plural.”152 Derrida’s neologism is 
designed for “us to hear in the term animot animals in their plural 
singularity rather than their generality (i.e., The Animal).”153 Again, by 
insisting on this neologism, Derrida tried to destabilize the Cartesian 
single and indivisible anthropological limit, while maintaining 
                                                            
146 LAWLOR, supra note 82; see also HARAWAY, supra note 15, at 3-45 (Haraway, 
another foundational figure in posthumanism, further complicates this notion of 
abyssal limits between species by also suggesting at the same time that the 
species do not exist without the encounter of the other—in other words, species 
(to the microbial level) make each up. This suggests that the multiplicity of 
limits must also account for a multiplicity and the necessity of contact zones 
between species). 
147 DERRIDA, supra note 15, at 32. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 1-50. 
150 See generally Taylor, supra note 8, at 41. 
151 See generally DERRIDA, supra note 15. 
152 MATTHEW CALARCO, ZOOGRAPHIES: THE QUESTION OF THE ANIMAL FROM 
HEIDEGGER TO DERRIDA 144 (1972). 
153 Id. (Calarco suggests Derrida’s desire is for a plural singularity in animot—in 
other words, each species, like the human, is absolute in its species being, 
however there are infinite abyssal limits between each species (a plurality of 
limits) and therefore, there must also be a plurality of relationships and ethical 
obligations between species). 
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absolute divisions between species.154 In doing so, Derrida at once 
avoided the slippery slope155 and avoided the “hominid cringe.”156 At 
the same time, Derrida opened the possibility of a multiplicity of 
relationships (and therefore, a need for a multiplicity of legal 
considerations) between species.157 
2. Great Apes Are Not Enough: Thinking Obligations Beyond 
Familiarity 
Both the Nonhuman Rights Project and the Great Ape Project, 
unsurprisingly, have focused their efforts on securing legal rights for 
great apes.158 The reasons for pursuing rights for great apes are based 
on an argument for familiarity because of familial proximity.159 
However, two issues with this approach arise: first, any victories won 
would not in and of themselves extend to other species,160 and second, 
the proximity or familiarity arguments risk further entrenching liberal 
humanism in law.161 Posthumanism offers a way to address these 
issues by proposing a clear break from the liberal humanist tradition 
and thinking anew where ethical obligations between species arise.162 
                                                            
154 See generally DERRIDA, supra note 15, at 29-50. 
155 LAWLOR, supra note 82. 
156 Taylor, supra note 8, at 41-42. 
157 LAWLOR, supra note 82. 
158 See NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 4; see also GOODALL ET AL., supra 
note 5. 
159 GOODALL ET AL., supra note 5, at 4-5. Humans are part of the great ape family 
and therefore the extension of rights to other great apes, chimpanzees, gorillas, 
and orangutans, makes sense. 
160 Taylor, supra note 8, at 41 (arguing that aligning The Great Ape Project with 
other animal rights would be a strategic error and that Apes are a worthy enough 
cause in and of themselves, and thus there need not be any larger consideration 
of other animals); see also WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3 
(identifying that the utilitarianism, and ultimately all analytical philosophy, both 
of which have a foundation in liberal humanism, always allow for a great deal of 
animal, and sometimes human, suffering to continue unabated). 
161 Deckha, supra note 120, at 232 (arguing that The Great Ape Project’s “trait-
based” argument, or proximity to humanness, ultimately just reinforces 
anthropocentrism (the liberal humanist legacy) of the current legal order). 
162 See generally WOLFE, supra note 17 (outlining how liberal humanism develops 
and affects our understanding of animals and by extension, how we understand 
ourselves). 
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The philosophies that flow out of the analytic tradition, including 
the utilitarianism that animates so much of the legal discourse around 
animal rights, largely serve to only reinforce liberal humanism and 
reduce “questions of justice to questions of entitlement.”163 
Posthumanism however seeks to relocate the nexus of ethical 
consideration away from the identification of human-like-ness—
through traits and capabilities—to shared vulnerability, shared 
finitude.164 Wolfe explained: 
[T]here are two kinds of finitude here [that human and 
non-human animals share], two kinds of passivity and 
vulnerability. The first type (physical vulnerability, 
embodiment, and eventually mortality) is paradoxically 
made unavailable, inappropriable, to us by the very 
thing that makes it available—namely, a second type of 
“passivity” or “not being able,” which is the finitude 
we experience in our subjection to a radically ahuman 
technicity or mechanicity of language, a technicity that 
has profound consequences, of course, for what we too 
hastily think of as “our” concepts, which are therefore 
in an important sense not “ours” at all.165 
Finitude, therefore, exists in both our shared mortality and proximity 
to death, but also in the limitation of the human’s relationship with 
itself.166 In other words, man’s knowing of himself, which only 
happens through the technicity of language, is the second limitation—
second vulnerability—and a form of finitude.167 The rendering of 
man’s relationship to himself is unstable, so too then, is man’s 
relationship to all other beings rendered unstable.168 Wolfe explained 
that the “most radical sense of Derrida’s posthumanism” is in the 
location of the “generative force of the nonliving at the origins of any 
living being, human or animal, who communicates (and this in the 
                                                            
163 WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3, at 79. 
164 Id. at 80 (Wolfe latches on to Derrida’s conception of ethics as the ethical 
foundation posthumanism—the sharing of finitude among species). 
165 Id. at 88. 
166 Id. at 90. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
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broadest sense) with another.169 Wolfe continued: “For these 
reasons—because of the estrangement of the ‘“the human’” from the 
‘“auto-’” that ‘“we’” give to ourselves—the relation[ship] between the 
human and the nonhuman animals is constantly opened anew and, as it 
were, permanently.”170 Therefore, it is through this relocation of 
ethics, of obligations between species, to this passivity—to shared 
finitude—that posthumanism offers a radical departure from the 
humanist tradition.171 The “estrangement” between species is mirrored 
by the “estrangement” through the technicity of language for man to 
himself172 and thus, places man not in some vaulted category above all 
else, but rather in the same position as other species.173 
 The shift to shared finitude upends the legacy of liberal humanism 
and opens the possibility of new considerations.174 It removes blanket 
categorizing of ethical obligations and instead insists on a 
heterogeneity of obligations.175 This insistence removes the possibility 
of proximity arguments—of how human like another species is176—
from the equation and instead insists on the heterogeneity of 
considerations that may be offered and the multiplicity of the solutions 
possible.177 Moreover, this heterogeneous approach to ethical 
considerations necessarily would entail a move that never forecloses 
the possibilities of considerations for other species or other rights.178 
                                                            




173 See generally CALARCO, supra note 152. 
174 See generally WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3. 
175 Id. at 96. 
176 See generally Taylor, supra note 8, at 41. 
177 See generally WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3, at 95-97 
(discussing how the local versus the universal could apply in Derrida). 
178 See generally Barnaby McLaughlin, Life vs. Unlife: Interspecies Solidarity and 
Companionism in Contemporary American Literature 24-53 (2015) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rhode Island) (on file with 
author) (discussing John Steinbeck’s reconfiguration from finitude to fortitude 
and the future possibilities of microbial ethics. Unlike Derrida, Steinbeck argues 
that what actually binds all life together is not our shared inevitable death, but 
rather, our biological drive to persist—that is to say, all life is defined by its 
desire to continue its species being and life in general. The shift from shared 
finitude to shared fortitude opens up a possibility for considering ethics on a 
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3. There Are No Models: Species Specific Legislation and a 
New Paradigm 
What exactly a posthumanist application of the law to animals 
would look like is difficult to conceive because it has never been 
done—the closest thing to a model that exists is in Switzerland.179 In 
Switzerland, beginning in 1999, several changes were made to its 
constitution to gradually allow for the inclusion of animals.180 First, 
the constitution was rewritten to include protection, but not rights, of 
animals.181 Next, in 2002, animals were acknowledged as explicitly 
not things in the Swiss Civil code.182 And finally, in 2009, Switzerland 
further amended its constitution to recognize that animals are beings 
and not things.183 However, even with the seemingly progressive 
nature of Switzerland’s approach, a 2010 referendum that would have 
granted standing to domestic animals was defeated, suggesting that the 
status of animals under the law, even in a place like Switzerland, is 
always precarious.184 Moreover, the 2010 referendum was only for 
companion species, so ever if passed, animals with significantly higher 
cognitive abilities would still not have standing.185 
Although the status of animals under the law in Switzerland is 
promising, there is still no indication that animals are being considered 
in their multiplicity, which a posthumanist approach would require.186 
Interestingly, the United States has previously recognized the 
multiplicity of species through federal legislation with both the 
Endangered Species Act187 and the Humane Methods of Slaughter 
                                                                                                                                            
microbial level that fully accounts for the multiplicity of being that Haraway 
identifies). 
179 See generally PATRICIA MACCORMACK, THE ANIMAL CATALYST: TOWARDS 
AHUMAN THEORY 33 (2014) (discussing the modifications to Switzerland’s 






185 Id. (MacCormack points out that a similar provision in the Czech Civil Code, 
which explicitly defines animals as not objects, is similarly shallow in its 
application). 
186 Id. 
187 Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2013). 
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Act.188 The Endangered Species Act allows for the identification of 
vulnerable species and the enactment of protective measures for those 
identified species.189 Similarly, the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act 
recognizes the difference between species because it does not cover 
chickens, which, by volume, are the most slaughtered animals in the 
United States.190 Both of these acts promote animal welfare and 
recognize that different animal species require different forms of 
protection.191 Unfortunately, because of the legacy of liberal 
humanism, the Endangered Species Act falls short because, although it 
recognizes the difference between animal species by being based on 
categories of species vulnerability, it does not actually recognize 
species multiplicity.192 The same is true for the Humane Methods of 
Slaughter Act, which again recognizes the difference between species 
implicitly by carving out protections for certain species, but fails to 
account for a multiplicity of ethical obligations based on the 
multiplicity of species.193 
                                                            
188 Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1907 (2012). 
189 See generally Endangered Species Act § 1533. 
190 See generally JONATHAN SAFRAN FOER, EATING ANIMALS 133 (2009) 
(discussing the fact that the USDA’s interpretation of the Humane Methods of 
Slaughter Act as not applying to chickens and therefore, the slaughter of 
chickens is particularly brutal. Id. “The conveyer systems drags the birds 
through an electrified water bath. This most likely paralyzes them but doesn’t 
render them insensible. . . . the voltage is kept low—about one-tenth the level 
necessary to render the animals unconscious. After it has travelled through the 
bath, a paralyzed bird’s eyes might still move. Sometimes the birds will have 
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an automated throat slitter.” Id.). 
191 See generally Endangered Species Act §§ 1531-1544 ; see also Humane 
Methods of Slaughter Act §§ 1901-1907. 
192 See Endangered Species Act § 1533. 
193 See generally Humane Methods of Slaughter Act §§ 1901-1907 (which, as 
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see also FOER, supra note 190 (in addition to the inhumane ways that chickens 
are currently slaughtered and their general lack of protection under the law, 
about 180 million chickens are improperly slaughtered, meaning that the arteries 
are missed when their throats are cut. Moreover, about four million chickens are 
alive and conscious when they are plunged into the scalding tanks). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The current state of animal welfare and animal rights before the 
law is rightfully being challenged on numerous fronts—with the 
Nonhuman Rights Project and the Great Ape Project being the most 
prominent examples. Both the Nonhuman Rights Project and the Great 
Ape Project have sought to expand the legal rights of non-human 
animals by focusing on great apes, though they have adopted different 
approaches. The Nonhuman Rights Project pursues ape rights through 
court challenges, while the Great Ape Project explicitly avoids the 
courts and works on passing legislation. Ultimately, the Great Ape 
Project has been successful in some countries, primarily Spain and 
New Zealand, whereas the Nonhuman Rights Project has largely been 
unsuccessful in the United States. The discrepancy in outcomes 
between the two projects demonstrates the value of legislative 
approaches over court challenges. Moreover, if legislation fails, as 
opposed to court challenges, no precedent is set; therefore, the Great 
Ape Project’s strategy is preferable. However, both the Great Ape 
Project and the Nonhuman Rights Project articulate arguments steeped 
in liberal humanism—these arguments might succeed in getting 
nominal rights for apes, but also might forever foreclose the possibility 
of “lower” species from getting access to any sort of legal rights. 
Therefore, an alternative to the liberal humanist tradition must form 
the basis for challenges to the legal order. 
Posthumanism offers the framework and vocabulary to move 
beyond the liberal humanist tradition when considering rights. 
Posthumanism’s insistence on the anthropological limit prevents the 
possibility of permitting all forms of human atrocities by insisting on a 
division between the human and all other species. However, 
posthumanism multiplies the limits and insists on absolute limits 
between each species and among each species. This re-articulation 
disrupts the humanist grasp on animal rights discourse by suggesting 
that anything less than considering the multiplicity of species—by 
considering heterogeneity—is a failure. In addition, by considering the 
individual species in its uniqueness, the slippery slope argument is 
rendered invalid. First, the relocation of the nexus of ethical 
obligations from human-likeness to shared finitude negates the 
possibility of liberal humanist articulations of rights. All that can die, 
that grapples with mortality, must be considered. This radical 
articulation unsettles the liberal humanist discourse because it does not 
matter how human-like your species is—the species uniqueness must 
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be given consideration. Therefore, there is the possibility that a highly 
intelligent creature, such as an octopus, may gain access to legal 
consideration that the liberal humanist tradition would preclude. 
Ultimately, the lack of consideration for animals stems from the liberal 
humanist origin of common law, and therefore, any meaningful change 
must come not from working within the liberal humanist framework, 
but rather from a radical challenge to that framework. Posthumanism 
offers both the theoretical foundation and the vocabulary to mount that 
challenge. In addition, because of the radical nature of posthumanism, 
the Great Ape Project’s legislative approach is the only real avenue for 
change; court challenges are simply too set in tradition to be amenable 
to opening the possibilities that heterogenic ethical considerations 
require. 
Ideally, the best approach to take would be to target state 
constitutions to pursue such a radical reconfiguration of how animals 
are viewed under the law. However, Switzerland’s model of 
recognizing animals in its constitution as “beings” and not “things” 
unfortunately also shows the limitation of a constitutional approach. 
The constitutional recognition of all animals as beings did not, 
however, automatically change the relationship between humans and 
animals, and therefore the practical effect of “being” status is little 
more than a rhetorical nicety. Therefore, it is essential that any 
legislative or constitutional approaches be firmly rooted in 
posthumanist discourse to avoid being more than rhetorical. 
Legislation must recognize the multiplicity of species and offer 
various relationships between those species and the law. The 
Endangered Species Act and the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act 
are in a sense legal recognition of Derrida’s animot, but they both 
collapse under interrogation. The starting point must be that all 
animals are beings, but that all beings are not the same animal. 
 
